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IS THE USE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FIT FOR PURPOSE? AN EXPLORATION OF 




Purpose: The aim of this paper is to explore issues in related to the use of financial 
accounting and reporting by discussing three interrelated areas: (i) the theoretical 
foundations, (ii) the framework and (iii) practicalities. The paper also discusses 
participatory and pluralistic approaches to accounting and corporate governance as 
alternatives to address some of these issues. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: This is narrative research based on deductive 
thematic analysis of secondary data. This study provides a general overview of the 
existing literature of the limits of the use of financial accounting and its impact on 
business and society. 
Findings: In terms of the theoretical foundations, this paper contrasts financial 
accounting explained by agency theory and a dialogic accounting approach. The 
findings of this study emphasize the need to establish an accounting framework for 
the interests of the many (not the few) in conjunction and simultaneously with a 
participatory and pluralistic approach to corporate governance. Finally, this paper 
explores accounting for carbon emissions and recent financial accounting scandals to 
analyse the impact of the inappropriate use of financial accounting and reporting in 
business and society. 
Originality: This paper provides an overview of the limits of the use of financial 
accounting by exploring its theoretical background, framework and practicalities. 
The paper also discusses the need for new accounting and corporate governance 
frameworks that allow for a pluralistic and participatory approach to the decision 
making of companies. 
 





This paper explores the limited function of financial accounting to sustain corporate 
practices fit for decision making in the context of the global finance economy. 
Financial accounting is a tool for financial decision making at the corporate level; 
therefore, it cannot be considered as an isolated set of numbers, but rather it should 
be consider as part of a much larger context. Financial accounting helps capitalism to 
organise freedom in the market and to provide rational explanations for capital 
accumulation on the basis of liberal economic democracy (Alawattage and 
Wickramasinghe, 2019). This is because competitive markets work efficiently via 
supply and demand establishing equilibriums. However, at the micro level of a 
corporation, mechanisms need to be in place to secure the ‘efficient’ use of financial 
capital since the origins of corporations mark a clear separation between the owners 
of capital and managers. Thus, financial accounting is a legalized visual and 
calculative language that organises the monetary performance of corporations to 
justify capital accumulation (Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2019). 
 
The literature mentions that one of the most serious issues of financial accounting is 
that it is sustained by neoclassical economics assumptions (Tinker et al., 1982; 
Tinker, 1984). This prevents, for example, financial accounting from representing 
reality fairly because financial accounting uses economic reductionism to express 
quantitative measurements of organisational performance (Tinker et al., 1982; 
Tinker, 1984). In addition, financial accounting constructs boundaries to 
organisations based on an arbitrary set of standards that are implemented via a 
process of classification and measurement (Davis et al., 1982; Hines, 1988). This 
process of measurement, classification and control aims to maximize individual 
utility, and thus it inhibits the inclusion of externalities, causing pervasive impacts on 
the natural environment and society (Dierker and Preston, 1977; Gray et al., 1988). 
 
This paper offers three complementary contributions to the above literature. First, 
this paper contrasts theoretical frameworks to expand the usefulness of accounting 
and corporate reporting. This discussion is driven by the necessity to generate 
broader organisational engagement via a dialogical approach (Brown and Dillard, 
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2013; Mouffe, 2013; Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009) to incorporate a range of 
aspects rather than a pure emphasis on economic performance. Second, this paper 
critically analyses financial accounting conventions as a mechanism to build 
organisational barriers with the views of capital accumulation. This is relevant 
because organisations need to be aware of risks and uncertainties, which can only be 
identified using an inclusive range of information sources that extrapolates the 
boundaries of financial accounting and reporting (Bebbington and Larrinaga-
Gonzalez, 2008). Third, the paper provides a reflection based on real-life examples, 
showing the pervasive impacts of the unfit use of financial accounting for business 
and society and its limitations as a financial decision making mechanism that 
determines resource allocation. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The second section explores the 
theoretical foundations of financial accounting in which agency theory is contrasted 
with the dialogical approach. The third section explains the research methods and 
methodology. The fourth section provides a critical reflection of the financial 
accounting and reporting framework to support decision making on the efficient 
allocation of resources. The fifth section discusses the limitations of financial 
accounting and reporting in practical terms. The sixth section suggests a 
participatory approach to financial accounting and reporting. Finally, the fifth section 
provides final comments. 
 
2. Theoretical foundations of financial accounting and reporting 
2.1 Economic approach 
There are different theoretical approaches to justify the existence of financial 
accounting. Agency theory, which uses an economic rationale, is one of the most 
used frameworks (Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2019; Solomon, 2013; Deegan, 
2013; Gray et al., 2014). The foundation of agency theory is neoclassical economics, 
and utility maximization is at the core because neoclassical economics tries to solve 
the resource scarcity problem to satisfy human needs. More specifically, agency 
theory uses neoclassical assumptions to explain agency relationships that, according 
to Jensen and Meckling (1976), can be defined “as a contract under which one or 
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more persons (the principal (s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to 
the agent" (p.308). In the context of agency theory, agents should have a single 
function, which is to maximize the principal’s profits. 
 
There are many questions that arise when financial accounting is explained using the 
lens of agency theory. However, this paper will concentrate on the following 
question: What is the boundary of a firm? For some economists, such as Ronald 
Coase, the boundary of a firm is limited to their contractual relations (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Friedman, 1970).  Authors from other theoretical perspectives 
defend that the boundary of a firm is much broader than contractual relations, and it 
involves firm relationships as a whole (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Brown 
and Dillard, 2013, 2015a). Unfortunately, financial accounting and reporting adopts a 
limited perspective by supporting a reduced view of a business because it tends to 
concentrate on the financial transactions of a firm by communicating only its 
financial performance in a short period, reinforcing and legitimizing profit 
maximization and capital accumulation (Tinker, 1984; Hines, 1988). 
 
2.2 Dialogical approach 
The previous section discussed accounting using an economic perspective. This 
section critically explores accounting by referring to policy studies. More specifically, 
this section considers the pluralist approach (E.g.:Mouffe, 2013; Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001), which has recently developed as the basis of agonistic political theory (Brown, 
2017). 
 
Agonistic political theory challenges the rationalism and individualism of liberalism 
because it will tend to achieve a rational consensus and reconciliation that supports 
powerful elites (Mouffe, 2013). Contrary to liberalism, agonistic political theory 
envisages antagonism, which is expressed by empowering conflictive views and 
struggles between adversaries – not enemies (Mouffe, 2013). A consensus is 
considered problematic and impossible to achieve. 
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The participatory approach in accounting is justified by the fact that businesses 
involve citizenship issues, and thus the public should scrutinize its operations (Brown 
and Dillard, 2015a). This approach involves two interrelated processes that should 
aim to create value for stakeholders: (i) pluralistic and participatory governance and 
(ii) accounting that enables participatory governance through a reflection of 
organisational practices from different sociopolitical perspectives (Brown and Dillard, 
2015a, 2015b; Bebbington et al., 2007). Participatory and pluralistic governance 
enables the engagement of different discourses and structures to review the 
accountability technologies in place. Plural participation is an alternative to challenge 
the status quo because it would require the inclusion of a broad range of 
perspectives, thus acknowledging and confronting asymmetries of power (Brown 
and Dillard, 2015a; Bebbington et al., 2007). Engagement is then essential because it 
has the potential to challenge current forms of governance structures run by 
dominated elites (Brown and Dillard, 2015a; Bebbington et al., 2007) and include 
marginalized groups (Bebbington et al., 2007). 
 
Some authors suggested a transition from a monologic to a dialogic type of 
accounting (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Brown and Dillard, 2013, 2015a). 
As table 1 shows, monologic accounting concentrates on a rational consensus, and it 
is discharged via mainstream accounting. Conventional accounting is based on facts 
and portrayed as neutral, and it uses technical language understood by experts. In 
the context of monologic accounting, profit maximization should be prioritized, and 
thus the dominance of capital markets and a shareholder focus are taken for 
granted. Governance is delegated to a minority elite. Conversely, dialogic accounting 
is confrontational in nature because it aims to create shareholder value, and thus it 
can take place in multiple spaces where conflicting perspectives emerge. Its format 
involves a variety of calculative and narrative formats to address different audiences. 
Finally, it contests the dominant discourse of profit maximization and refuses the 
privilege of capital markets, opening space for inclusion and a participatory type of 
governance. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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Despite the benefits of a participatory approach to accounting, its implementation 
remains a challenge. Many difficulties were identified in the literature. For example, 
the use of the technical language of conventional accounting is a barrier for many 
marginalized groups, and it is difficult to provide accountability using different 
formats from a variety of sociopolitical perspectives (Brown and Dillard, 2015a). 
Finally, there is a need to constantly challenge power asymmetries and dominant 
neoclassical assumptions, which prevents stakeholder engagement in an open 
dialogue (Brown and Dillard, 2015a). 
 
3. Research methods and methodology 
This paper is narrative research that explores the limits of financial accounting and 
reporting (Berg, 2004; Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2010). Secondary data from many 
sources are analysed, such as the following (see table 2): (i) the UK Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting, (ii) the UK Corporate Governance Code, (iii) the 
annual reports produced by companies in the combustible sector with European 
Union Emissions Trading (EU ETS)  inhalations, (iv) Financial Reporting Council 
reports on the investigation of financial scandals, (v) professional reports and 
webpages and (vi) newspaper articles. Deductive thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; 
Joffe and Yardley, 2004) was applied to develop a narrative (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 
2010) on the limits of the use of financial accounting and reporting applying the lens 
of a dialogical approach to accounting.  
 
4. Framework of financial accounting and reporting 
4.1 Accounting as a mechanism of control and boundary setting 
This section will continue exploring the boundaries of organisations, but it will now 
emphasise how financial reporting can delineate such limits. According to the new 
UK Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (International Financial Reporting 




“The objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial 
information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential 
investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions relating to providing 
resources to the entity. Those decisions involve decisions about: 
(a) buying, selling or holding equity and debt instruments; 
(b) providing or settling loans and other forms of credit; or 
(c) exercising rights to vote on, or otherwise influence, management’s 
actions that affect the use of the entity’s economic resources.” (p. A17) 
 
This definition clarifies at least three main boundaries that are set by financial 
reporting. The first boundary refers to the concise audience of financial reporting, 
which is limited to those that provide financial resources to the organisation, such as 
the following: ‘Investors, lenders and other creditors’.  The second barrier is that 
financial reporting concentrates on financial information only. Finally, the third 
barrier is that financial reporting concentrates on the financial information of one 
particular entity in isolation. The neoclassical assumption of utility maximization at 
the micro level of a corporation is very clear in the above definition. All other 
information within one entity that is not financial is excluded. This is a rational 
choice to prioritize information on profit maximization. 
 
The norms that regulate financial reporting are the following: accounting 
conventions, accounting standards and other sets of regulations (e.g., company law 
and norms set by stock markets and other national/international regulations) 
(Bebbington et al., 2001). An analysis of accounting conventions can provide a more 
detailed overview of the limits of financial reporting. Accountancy conventions are 
concepts generally accepted in the elaboration of external financial reporting 
(Financial Reporting Council - FRC, 2017). These concepts help to delineate 
boundaries of financial reporting, and thus these boundaries can also be perceived 
as limitations of financial reporting to embrace a pluralistic accounting approach.  
Table 3 below explains the accounting conventions. 
 
In summation, table 3 reinforces that accounting conventions set the barriers for an 
organisation to use exclusively financial information within a short-term perspective. 
Thus, financial reporting is periodical financial information that can show whether 
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the objectives of organisations (as a unit of a business) are in line with 
macroeconomic objectives of wealth accumulation. This is indeed a powerful 
rational and objective mechanism of governance that works at a distance to 
maintain the current notions of capitalism by emphasizing a consistent notion of 
capital exploitation and accumulation, which is portrayed as “the true and fair view” 
of organisational performance (Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2019). 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
According to the UK Conceptual Framework of Financial Reporting, financial 
information should also have qualitative characteristics, such as the following: 
relevance (including information relevant for decision making – the value of the 
information to users), materiality (including information that influences the decisions 
of the primary users of the information if omitted, misstated or obscured – nature or 
magnitude) and faithful representation (information should be complete and neutral 
with no bias and error-free) (International Financial Reporting Standards - IFRS 
Foundation, 2018). The materiality and relevance of financial information are also 
important topics to consider in terms of the pluralistic approach to accounting. 
These topics are explored in more detail using a practical example of emissions 
allowances in section 4.1 that follows. 
 
It is relevant to clarify that this study does not dispute the fact that financial 
accounting works well to achieve the aims established in the framework. This paper 
also recognizes that the limitations of financial accounting and reporting are 
transparent in the framework. However, financial accounting is a tool that needs to 
be used by professionals to produce an outcome. Thus, the accountancy profession 
is institutionalized within an organized hierarchical structure of power, which 
dictates how the financial information of corporations should be managed, 
elaborated, presented and verified/audited (Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2019). 
This hierarchical structure comprises the following: regulators (e.g., the Financial 
Reporting Council), professional accounting bodies (e.g., ACCA, ICAEW, CIMA and 
ICAS) and accounting firms/professional accountants (e.g., KPMG, E&Y, PwC and 
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Deloitte) (Oxford Economics and CCAB, 2018; FRC, 2017). The accountancy 
profession is then normalized and regulated within this structure. Consequently, 
financial reporting is produced by accountancy professionals who participate in this 
structure and are instructed to follow standardized reporting norms (IFRS 
Foundation, 2018). 
 
Many problems related to financial accounting and reporting are associated with its 
inappropriate use, so this paper seeks to highlight some of these problems. More 
specifically, this paper argues that a meaningful transformation of financial 
accounting and reporting is necessary. This transformation process should be 
conveyed simultaneously by both pluralistic and participatory governance and 
accounting that enables participatory governance. 
 
The next section explores the need to change financial accounting and reporting to 
enable informed decision making and risk management. 
 
4.2 The use of financial reporting for decision making and risk management 
 
“The first version of the UK Corporate Governance Code (the Code) was 
published in 1992 by the Cadbury Committee. It defined corporate 
governance as ‘the system by which companies are directed and controlled. 
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. 
The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the 
auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure 
is in place.’ This remains true today, but the environment in which 
companies, their shareholders and wider stakeholders operate continues to 
develop rapidly.”(FRC, 2018c: 1) 
 
The quote above refers to the definition of corporate governance in the new version 
of the UK Corporate Governance Code. This quote expresses that corporate 
governance is a system to control and direct companies. This quote also recognises 
that companies are inserted in a constant changing environment, and thus 
companies’ operations cannot be assessed in isolation. Companies require 
investments, and thus the risks involved in business dynamics can lead to gains or 
losses (Solomon, 2013). Thus, correct incentives should be in place to identify, 
 17 
manage, mitigate and avoid high-risk strategies (Gendron et al., 2016). The Financial 
Reporting Council published guidance on risk management, internal control and 
related financial and business reporting (FRC, 2014). This guidance stresses the 
relevance of corporate disclosure to increase transparency on the risks and 
uncertainties faced by the business. It also reinforces the premise that risks are 
particular to each type of business, and thus disclosure should help users understand 
these peculiarities (FRC, 2014). 
 
However, the previous sections of this paper explained that financial statements 
have a limited scope, and thus they provide a partial view of organisations’ 
operations. Thus, concentrating decision making in only financial statements is 
insufficient. There were several mandatory initiatives in the UK to complement the 
scope of financial reporting. Table 4 shows examples of the compulsory social and 
environmental information in annual reports. These disclosure initiatives are 
welcomed, but they are still insufficient to provide comparability and a 
multidimensional perspective of the business in the long term. 
 
The Operating Financial Review (OFR) was one relevant attempt in the UK to enable 
broader participation and engagement with financial reporting (Gray et al., 2014; 
Solomon, 2013). The proposal suggested a compulsory narrative analysis of the 
financial position of large companies in annual reports using plain language and 
including nonfinancial information (Gray et al., 2014; Solomon, 2013). For example, 
the OFR would require an account of companies’ relationships with main 
stakeholders such as employees, customers and suppliers (Gray et al., 2014). In 
addition, the OFR would require disclosures on companies’ policies and performance 
on environmental, community, social, ethical and reputational issues (Gray et al., 
2014). This initiative failed, and consequently it was decided that nonfinancial 
disclosures in annual reports should comply with the EU Modernization Directive 




5 Practicalities: Is financial accounting sufficient to support informed decision 
making? 
5.1 The case of emissions allowances 
In 2005, the EU ETS was launched as a policy to tackle climate change. The EU ETS 
set a cap on emissions per installation. Then, organisations can decide if they will 
reduce emissions or buy emissions in the market to compensate for their emissions 
over the established cap. Just before the EU ETS started to operate, in 2004, the IFRC 
issued IFRIC interpretation 3 on Emissions Rights. However, in June 2005, this 
interpretation was withdrawn due to potential volatility and mismatches. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
There have not been accounting financial standards on emissions allowances since 
this attempt approximately 15 years ago. As a result, companies use a variety of 
accounting approaches to account for emissions rights, thereby impairing the 
comparability of financial statements (Black, 2013; Cook, 2009; Deloitte, 2012; Lovell 
et al., 2013; PWC and IETA, 2007). Several attempts were made to establish an 
alternative to this predicament, including a joint initiative by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB), but they were unsuccessful. A recent development on this issue is 
research on emissions allowances on hold at the IASB under the title “the Pollutant 




Emissions markets are growing around the world, and they set a price for 
pollution/emissions; therefore, it is expected that these financial events would be 
recognised in financial statements, considering that emissions are relevant and 
material to the users of accounting (Lovell et al., 2013). According to the World Bank 
Group, there are currently 26 carbon markets operating around the world. Market 
initiatives, such as carbon markets and carbon taxes, accounted for 20% of the global 
greenhouse gases, representing US$82 billion in 2018 (World Bank Group, 2018, 
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2019). Despite these figures, the literature shows a high incidence of nondisclosure 
of carbon allowances in financial statements (Lovell et al., 2013; PWC and IETA, 
2007). 
 
Very few participants in the EU ETS provided information in financial statements that 
allows one to trace reductions in the use of emissions allowances per year. Only four 
out of 16i combustible companies with EU ETS installations listed by Lovel et al. 
(2013) provided such data (see table 5). Moreover, only three of these 16 firms 
disclosed results on sales of carbon allowances (Eesti Energia, CEZ and Vattenfall 
Nederland B.V.- formerly Nuon). Standard setters may find it difficult to find a reason 
to account for carbon emissions if there is no material profit to disclose since profits 
are one of the most relevant measures of success in financial accounting. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Many studies have explored emissions allowances to highlight examples of the 
limitations of financial reporting standards. For example, MacKenzie (2009) 
mentioned that carbon markets are an economic mechanism that gives a price to an 
externality, and accounting is unable to translate this ‘economic reality’ into financial 
standards. Lovell et al. (2013) mentioned that financial reporting creates a reality 
because accounting is a tool from which many financial decisions are made. Thus, if 
emission allowances are not disclosed, relevant information is omitted, thus 
affecting not only users’ decision making, but also the reputation of the accounting 
profession regarding its commitment to tackle climate change. Finally, the lack of 
engagement of standard setters was also highlighted as a barrier to understanding 
interdisciplinary issues, such as climate change (de Aguiar, 2018; Lovell, 2014; Lovell 
and MacKenzie, 2011; Thistlethwaite, 2011). 
 
The next section complements the above discussion by providing real-life examples 
that illustrate the negative impact that an unfit use of financial accounting may have 
on businesses and broader society. 
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5.2 A reflection on financial scandals 
Effective corporate governance should implement mechanisms to control the 
operations of organisations and mechanisms to verify the accuracy of financial 
information (Solomon, 2013). Examples of control mechanisms include the following: 
nonexecutive directors on the board of directors, internal and external auditing and 
the existence of internal committees in areas of auditing, remuneration and 
nominations (Solomon, 2013). However, financial scandals are continuously 
occurring even when these control mechanisms are in place. Table 6 gives examples 
of such scandals. Please note that these scandals are only extreme examples. The 




Much has been discussed on potential ways to prevent these faults. One relevant 
issue discussed is executive remuneration (Solomon, 2013; KPMG, 2018). A recent 
commissioned report recommended some mechanisms to control executive 
remuneration in order to prevent abuses and the manipulation of financial reports, 
which is a reference for performance measurement that can consequently influence 
variable remuneration. Examples of those measures are the following: the disclosure 
of executive remuneration contracts, the disclosure of the names and ethnicities of 
employees who earn over £150,000 per year and the disclosure of a clear 
justification for bonuses attached to extraordinary performance (Sikka et al., 2018). 
 
Another aspect under scrutiny is the independence of auditors and their 
participation in the market (Solomon, 2013). For example, in 2018, 93% of the FTSE 
100 was audited by the Big  4s (KPMG, E&Y, PwC and Deloitte, (FRC, 2019).  The 
control of the external auditing market by very few firms can potentially affect the 
independence of the services provided due to potential conflicts of interest (Work 
and Pensions and BEIS, 2018). In addition, the fact that auditing firms normally offer 
other consulting services to existing audit clients has also been under scrutiny (FRC, 
2018b; Work and Pensions and BEIS, 2018). Recently, the Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA) opened a review of accountancy firms in response to lost 
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confidence in assurance services due to the considerable number of recent scandals 
(ICAEW, 2019b).  Auditing firms are acting in response to this review. For example, 
KPMG committed to eliminate nonauditing services to FTSE 350 audit clients (ICAEW, 
2018a). However, these actions were not sufficient to restore confidence in financial 
information, and the CMA and politicians are pressuring authorities to separate the 
big audit firms in order to secure the quality of the services provided (ICAEW, 2019b; 
Work and Pensions and BEIS, 2018; ICAEW, 2019a). 
 
There is also an active debate on the role of auditing in a participatory governance 
approach. For example, there are suggestions that auditors should act as whistle 
blowers on illegal practicesii. In addition, an independent review of the quality and 
effectiveness of audits conducted by Sir Donald Brydon emphasized a broader scope 
of auditing (Brydon, 2019a) Recommendations from this review included the 
following (Brydon, 2019b): (i) auditors should be free to disclose original and 
material information to a wide range of users and not only shareholders; (ii) 
standards and rules should be set to govern the behaviour of corporate auditors; (iii) 
there should be education, training and retraining of professionals involved with 
corporate auditing, including forensic accounting and fraud; (iv) a simple mechanism 
should be established that enables the workforce to raise issues about risk and 
assurance; (v) audit fees should be disclosed; (vi) auditors should report significant 
risks similar to or greater than those reported by the directors; and (vii) auditors 
should report any disconnection between the culture companies claim via their 
directors and the behaviour observed by the auditors. 
 
Table 6 also shows the impacts of financial scandals on different groups of 
individuals. This reinforces the need for a pluralistic account in order to consider how 
individuals are connected to organisations and how organisations are responsible for 
these links. Pluralistic and participatory accounting and governance suggests an 
approach that holds organisations accountable for marginalised groups that financial 
accounting and reporting normally ignores, as exemplified in table 6. Discussions on 
improvements in the use of accounting and governance stress the relevance of 
employee participation on the board of directors iii . The relevance of such 
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participation lies in the fact that capitalism has been considered to be an extension 
of proprietarianism that defends private property (Piketty, 2020). In capitalism, the 
decision power is concentrated in the hands of the owners of the capital who control 
corporations based on their voting rights, which are assigned according to their 
shareholdings (Piketty, 2020). Thus, sharing power in corporations is one alternative 
that is suggested to overcome capitalism and private property, which would allow 
participatory decisions while allocating resources (Piketty, 2020). 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In Germany, for example, since the late 1940s, workers have occupied half of the 
seats on boards of directors (Piketty, 2020). This decision was influenced by the post-
World War II movement when the German constitution established the definition of 
ownership rights, which included a broader perspective considering ‘the general 
interest and the good of the community’ (Piketty, 2020: 973). Comanagement in 
Germany has been successful in many aspects, for example, by setting long-term 
strategies and promoting more productive and equal models of work (Piketty, 2020). 
 
The recent UK Corporate Governance Code shows an initial move towards broader 
engagement. For example, companies are now required to disclose their 
engagement with suppliers, customers and employees (FRC, 2018c). The UK 
Corporate Governance Code also requires half of the boards of directors to be 
nonexecutive directors (FRC, 2018c). However, compliance with the code is subject 
to a ‘comply or explain’ approach; therefore, questions can be raised on the 
effectiveness and urgency of the code at promoting engagement. 
 
6 Suggested participatory approach to financial accounting and reporting 
This section summarises the literature discussed above to suggest improvements to 
financial accounting and reporting towards a more participatory approach. First, this 
paper reinforces the idea that in order to improve accountability, it is essential to 
maintain good corporate governance practices. In turn, good corporate governance 
practices are essential to secure an appropriate use of financial accounting. Thus, 
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participatory governance and accountability should coexist simultaneously (Brown 
and Dillard, 2015a, 2015b; Bebbington et al., 2007). 
 
Second, in terms of financial reporting, this study suggests a similar approach to the 
Operating Financial Review in which large companies would provide an analysis of 
the financial position of their organisation. This analysis would be delivered in the 
format of a narrative using a plain language as part of the annual report. This 
analysis should also include an account of stakeholders’ relationships and 
environmental, community, societal, ethical and reputational issues. This 
information would be open to consultation among employees before being 
published. Employees would have an opportunity to discuss the information and to 
raise concerns. A whistleblowing system would also be in place iv. 
 
Standard setters could also support a participatory approach to financial accounting 
and reporting by engaging more broadly with accounting users and across disciplines 
(de Aguiar, 2018; Lovell, 2014; Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011; Thistlethwaite, 2011). 
This would help to understand new realities outside the scope of financial 
accounting, such as carbon markets. Finally, accountancy bodies should also enhance 
engagement with practitioners, academics and society to disseminate the role of 
accountants in tackling social and environmental problems currently faced. This 
could happen, for example, via social mediav and by sponsoring research on the 
areavi. 
 
Third, in terms of governance, this paper suggests that the remuneration of 
directors, which vary according to firms’ financial results, should be terminated. 
Fixed remuneration of more than £150,000 per year should be publicly disclosed 
(Sikka et al., 2018). Employees should be part of the boards of directors (Piketty, 
2020). Finally, with regard to auditing, the recommendations from Sir Donald 





7 Final comments 
This paper contributed to the literature by discussing the limits of the use of financial 
accounting and reporting by exploring three complementary issues: the theoretical 
foundations, the framework and practicalities. The discussions were initiated with a 
critical analysis of neoclassical economics as the frame to support concepts of 
financial accounting and reporting. It reinforced the need for a transition to a 
democratic approach to accounting that goes beyond corporate rational decisions of 
profit maximization at the cost of marginalised groups in society. 
 
This paper also stressed the relevance of the dialogical approach to accounting and 
reporting as a possible alternative (Brown and Dillard, 2013; Mouffe, 2013; 
Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009). This is because financial accounting and 
reporting is a legalised and institutionalised set of hierarchical arrangements for 
supporting decision making from the perspective of an individual organisation and 
within the short term. Many regulatory requirements have been implemented to 
overcome these limitations. However, apparently, it is not a common interest to 
start a “revolution” in corporate reporting, but rather the focus is on a simple 
evolution to the current methods of business communication (PwC, 2019). 
 
Finally, this paper argued on the usefulness of financial accounting and reporting by 
highlighting how its unfit use and limitations may have negative impacts on business 
and society.  The current international finance economy context evokes a type of 
information and corporate governance that extends the financial boundaries of 
organisations and short-termism to evaluate the risks and uncertainties of business 
operations in a participatory and pluralistic manner. Thus, participatory and 
pluralistic accounting and governance should occur simultaneously. Reporting should 
then be perceived at the centre of this engagement process so that the ways in 
which financial accounting is currently produced and used may not be fit for this 
particular purpose. The paper also discusses some suggestions to improve the 
limitations to financial accounting and reporting, which may be of the interest to 
accounting professionals and policy makers. 
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Future research on this topic can evaluate the impact of changes in the 2018 UK 
Corporate Governance Code to improve the use of financial accounting and 
engagement during decision making in UK companies. This research can specifically 
explore the views of employees in the process of improving corporate governance by 







Table 1 – Monologic x dialogic accounting 
 DIALOGIC ACCOUNTING MONOLOGIC ACCOUNTING 





 Confrontational in nature; 
 Dominant discourse is 
contested by including a 
pluralistic perspective; 
 Refuse to privilege capital 
markets. 
 Based on consensus; 
 Neutral scope based on facts to 
support current status-quo; 
 Rational and supportive of 
utility maximization. 
PLATFORM  Developed in multiple spaces 
where social conflicting 
perspectives emerges; 
 View from the outside of an 
organisation. 
 Driven by normative forces 
(e.g. regulations, standard 
setters and professional 
bodies); 
 View from the inside of an 
organisation. 
INCLUSION Fully inclusive. Shareholder focus. 
GOVERNANCE Pluralistic and participatory. Centred on minority elites. 




Table 2 – Secondary data 
N Institution Type Description  
1 FRC Staff Guidance Note The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013 – Key Facts (2013) 
2 FRC Guidance Guidance on risk management, internal control and related financial and business reporting (2014) 
3 FRC Report Non-financial reporting (2016) 
4 FRC Report Key facts and trends in the accountancy professions (2017) 
5 FRC Report BHS-Financial Reporting Council (2018) 
6 FRC Report Key facts and trends in the accountancy professions (2018) 
7 FRC Report The UK corporate governance code (2018) 
8 FRC Report Use of IFRC around the world (2018) 
9 ICAEW News SFO opens Tesco criminal investigation (2014) 
10 ICAEW News FRC closes probe into PwC’s audit of Tesco (2017) 
11 ICAEW News KPMG to stop doing non-audit work on FTSE 350 clients (2018) 
12 ICAEW news  Patisserie Valerie investigates potential accounting fraud (2018 
13 ICAEW News BDO considers UK audit practice split (2019) 
14 ICAEW News CMA proposes radical reshaping of UK audit (2019) 
15 IFRC News Strengthening the relevance of financial reporting (2019) 
16 IFRC Foundation Framework Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (2018) 
17 KPMG  Report Guide to directors’ remuneration 2018  
18 PwC Report The non-financial reporting regulations What do they mean in practice? (2017) 
19 PwC Report The reporting dilemma – balancing the needs of shareholders and other stakeholders PwC's Annual Review of 
Corporate Reporting in the FTSE 350 2018/19 (2019) 
20 PwC and IETA Report Trouble-Entry Accounting: Revisited (2017) 
21 Labour policy making Report Controlling Executive Remuneration: Securing Fairer Distribution of Income (2018) 
22 BIES Report Report on Carillion: Conclusions and recommendation (2018) 
23 World Bank Group Report State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2018 and 2019 
24 Annual reports Financial statements Reports from combustion companies with EU ETS installations ETS listed in Lovell et al. (2013) 
25 Deloitte Report The carbon price accounting for carbon (2012) 
26 European Union Guidelines Guidelines on reporting climate-related information (2019) 
27 UK Government Review Independent Review and recommendations into the Quality and Effectiveness of Audit (2019) 
28 Newspaper articles  A range of 12 articles published from 2014 to 2019 on audit fails in financial accounting scandals 
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Table 3 – Accounting conventions 





concentrates on events 
with monetary value 
only. 
It prevents the inclusion of relevant 
events which are not monetarily 
measured, such as: Human rights, 
environmental degradation, equality 
and diversity, etc. 
Entity  Financial reporting treats 
an organisation and 
participants of this 
organisation separately.  
It emphasizes the notion that an 
entity has to be perceived in 
isolation as a profit maximization 
unit. 
Going concern  It is the assumption that 
organisations will 
continue its operation in 
the future in its present 
form. 
It can overestimate companies’ 
values. Future operations can be 
committed by different reasons, such 
as: bankruptcy, scarcity of resources 
(e.g. oil exploitation), etc. Thus, going 
concern provide support 
misinterpretations of information. 
Perhaps, a prudent perspective 
would evaluate companies as if they 
would fail by considering social and 
environmental constrains rather than 
take for granted their continuation. 
Accrual and 
matching 
Financial attributes of 
events are recorded in 
the period they occur. 
It can prevent a broader perspective 
of events rather than only financial 
focus; which benefits can be 
perceived in a long distant future 
when the institution may no longer 
exist (e.g. emissions reductions). 
Prudence Caution and pessimism 
while recording financial 
events. 
It considers prudence in a narrow 
view. Prudence should be expanded 
to non-financial events. 
Consistency Financial report should 
be produced on the 
same basis every year 
within the organisations.  
This shows that financial report 
sustains the same status quo with no 
conflicts and no changes. 
Periodicity Financial report should 
be produced for a 
specific period, which is 
normally one year. 
This reinforces a short-term view of 
profit maximization rather than long-
term perspective. 





Table 4: Examples of social and environmental disclosure in annual reports 
DISCLOSURE CHARACTERISTICS 
Business review 
(UK Companies Act 
2006) 
Content: 
A review of the business including, for example: Risks and 
uncertainties as well as key performance indicators and non-
financial key performance indicators. 
 
Note:  
There is no clear guidance on social and environmental 
disclosure. In addition, external auditing was not 
compulsory but only encouraged. 
Strategic report  
(2013 Regulation) 
Content: 
Strategic report should include all content of the Business 
Review. For quoted companies, the regulation included 
additional disclosure, such as: Strategy and business model 
as well as human rights and gender diversity. 
 
Note:  





Greenhouse gas emissions disclosure.  
 
Note:  
This information should be presented by quoted companies 
in the Directors’ Report.  
Non-financial 
information  
(2016 Regulation - 
response to the EU 
Directive) 
Content: 
Impact of businesses activity relating to: Environmental, 
employee, social, respect for human rights, anti-corruption 
and anti-bribery matters (FRC, 2016: :2). 
 
Note:  
This information should be presented in the strategic report 
and it applies to large companies/groups. 
Miscellaneous 
reporting 
(2018 UK Corporate 
Governance Code) 
Content: 
Examples of information required are:  
• Engagement with supply chain, customers and employees; 
• Corporate governance arrangements; 
• CEO’s remuneration in relation to employees; 




This information expands the scope of the Strategic Report 
and Directors’ Report and it applies to companies only (e.g. 
excludes Limited Liability Partnership). 
Sources: FRC, 2018c; Solomon, 2013; FRC, 2016, 2013; PwC, 2017. 
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Table 5: Examples of recent UK scandals related to financial reporting 
 Company 
name 
Emissions rights 2019 
(Million metric tons of CO2) 
Emissions rights 2018 
(Million metric tons of CO2) 
1 ENDESA 31.1 34.8 
2 EDF 21 24 
3 CEZ 25,9 26,8 
4 RWE 81 118 
Source: 2019 financial statements of combustion companies with EU ETS installations 
listed in Lovell et al. (2013) 
 17 
Table 6: Examples of recent UK scandals related to financial reporting 
ORGANISATION SECTOR YEAR OF 
THE 
SCANDAL 










Supermarket 2014 Overstated profits (e.g. paying 





Suppliers and investors 
(profit fallen – lower 
dividends).  
PwC 
BHS High Street 
Retailer 
2016 Several allegations of misconduct, 
such as manipulation of revenue, 
cost of sales and operating 
expenses using manual journal 
entry via inter-group charge. 
Liquidation with a 
pension scheme 
deficit of £571 
million 
11,000 members of 








2017 Accounts were constantly 
manipulated to increase revenues. 
Suppliers’ payments were delayed 
120 days. However, just before 
carillion’s collapse record dividends 
were paid as well as large 
performance bonus. 
 Liquidation with 
liabilities of 
approximately 
£7 billion and 
£29 million in 
cash. 
 £2.6 billion in 
pension fund 
liability 
 2,000 people lost 
their jobs; 
 27,000 members of 
pension fund 
affected; 
 Owed £2 billion to 
30,000 to creditors; 













Café chain 2018 Manipulated accounts with false 
entries. For example, delay in 
suppliers’ payment to increase 
profit and hold of cash was, 
apparently, a common practice. 
£20 million debit 
and £1.14 million 
unpaid tax. 
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